Posts Tagged ‘rationality in/of law’

Csaba VARGA: Comparative Legal Cultures; On Traditions Classified, their Rapprochement & Transfer, and the Anarchy of Hyper-rationalism (2012)

March 12, 2012 Leave a comment

Comparative Legal Cultures On Traditions Classified, their Rapprochement & Transfer, and the Anarchy of Hyper-rationalism (Budapest: Szent István Társulat 2012) 251 [Philosophiae Iuris]

DISCIPLINARY ISSUES:   Law as Culture? [2002] / Trends in Comparative Legal Studies [2002] / Comparative Legal Cultures: Attempts at Conceptualisation [1997] / Comparative Legal Cultures? [2001] / Theatrum legale mundi On Legal Systems Classified [2005] / Legal Traditions? In Search for Families and Cultures in Law [2004] / Something New, Something Old in the European Identity of Law? [1995]    //   FIELD STUDIES:    Meeting Points between the Traditions of English–American Common Law and Continental-French Civil Law: Developments and Experience of Postmodernity in Canada [2002] / Man Elevating Himself? Dilemmas of Rationality in our Age [2000] / Rule of Law? Mania of Law? On the Boundary between Rationality and Anarchy in America [2002] / Transfers of Law: A Conceptual Analysis [2003] // Theory of Law – Legal Ethnography, Or the Theoretical Fruits of the Inquiries into Folkways [2008]

Csaba VARGA: Paradigms of Legal Thinking (1999/2012)

March 12, 2012 Leave a comment

The Paradigms of Legal Thinking [1999] enlarged 2nd ed. (Budapest: Szent István Társulat 2012) 418 [Philosophiae Iuris]


2. METHODOLOGICAL DIRECTIONS IN THINKING (2.1. The example of legal development [2.1.1. Classical Greek antiquity, 2.1.2. Roman legal development { The dikaion-period, Praetorian law. Justinian’s codification]}, 2.1.3. Enlightened absolutism, 2.1.4. The codificational ideal of the Code civil, 2.1.5. Turning point in the way of thinking], 2.2. The example of geometry [2.2.1. Euclidean geometry, 2.2.2. Challenge by Bolyai and Lobachevsky, 2.2.3. Einstein’s revolution], 2.3. The example of thinking [2.3.1. Autonomy { New Testament argumentation, Cicero’s testimony, Saint Augustine, The Talmudic lesson, Orthodox Christianity, Modern “irrationalism”, Beyond conceptual strait-jackets, Patterns of thought, patterns of law}, 2.3.2. Heteronomy { Saint Thomas Aquinas, Grotius, Leibniz}, 2.3.3. The dilemma of the evolution of thought)


4. PARADIGMS OF THINKING (4.1. The paradigm of paradigms [4.1.1. Conventionality, 4.1.2. Cultural dependence, 4.1.3. The nature of paradigms], 4.2. The basic notions of “fact”, “concept”, “logic”, and “thinking” [4.2.1. The need for a change of paradigms, 4.2.2. The false alternative of objectivism and subjectivism, 4.2.3. What are facts?, 4.2.4. What are notions?], 4.3. Dilemmas of conceptualising the norm)

5. DILEMMAS OF MEANING (5.1. Theories of meaning [5.1.1. Lexicality, 5.1.2. Contextuality, 5.1.3. Hermeneutics, 5.1.4. Open texture, 5.1.5. Deconstructionism], 5.2. Social construction of meaning [5.2.1. Speech-acts, 5.2.2. Social institutionalisation], 5.3. Autopoiesis and systemic response)

6. PARADIGMS OF LEGAL THINKING (6.1. The nature of law [6.1.1. Law as process, 6.1.2. Multifactorality, 6.1.3. Law as made up from acts], 6.2. The nature of legal thinking)


Appendix I. LAW AND ITS APPROACH AS A SYSTEM (I.1. The logical structure of law as a historical product, I.2. Tendencies of formal rationalization in legal development)

Appendix II. IS LAW A SYSTEM OF ENACTMENTS? (II.1. Working models of law, II.2. Senses of contextuality in law, II.3. Jurisprudential approach and socio-ontological approach, II.4. Conclusions [II.4.1. Law as historical continuum, II.4.2. Law as open system, II.4.3. Law as complex phenomenon with alternative strategies, II.4.4. Law as an irreversible process, II.4.5. The genuinely societal character of law])

Appendix III. INSTITUTIONS AS SYSTEMS (III.1. A logic of systems, III.2. Ideal types and historically concrete manifestations, III.3. Ideal type as a normative ideology, III.4. Objectivity and contingency of systems, III.5. Limits and bonds, consequentiality and practicability of a system)

Appendix IV. LEGAL TECHNIQUE (IV.1. Legal technique {IV.1.1. [In a broader sense], IV.1.2. [In legal practice], IV.1.3. [In legal scholarship], IV.1.4. [Law as a special technique]}, IV.2. On legal technique {IV.2.1. Definition and function, IV.2.2. Legal technique and legal cultures, IV.2.3. Postulates of legal technique in the cultures of modern formal law})

Appendix V. THE INHERENT AMBIVALENCE OF A RATIONAL APPROACH (Is the human fullness of being to be destroyed as a price of progress?)