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Csaba VARGA: Theory of the Judicial Process; The Establishment of Facts (1995/2011)

March 13, 2012 Leave a comment

Theory of the Judicial Process The Establishment of Facts [1995] 2nd {reprint} ed. with Postfaces I and II (Budapest: Szent István Társulat 2011) viii + 308

INTRODUCTION

1. PRESUPPOSITIONS OF LEGAL THEORY AND PRACTICE

2. THE FACT AND ITS APPROACH IN PHILOSOPHY AND IN LAW   2.1. The Understanding of Facts, 2.2. The Cognition of Facts, 2.3. Brute Fact and Institutional Fact (2.3.1. Process-like Development, 2.3.2. Graduality, 2.3.3. Being Attached to Objectivisation or Self-generation, 2.3.4. Indeterminateness, 2.3.5. Relativity, 2.3.6. Historicity and the Methodological Dilemma of Cognition), 2.4. The Particularity of the Appearance of Fact in Law

3. THE IMPUTATIVE CHARATER OF THE JUDICIAL ESTABLISHMENT OF FACTS   3.1. Logic of Problem Solving and Logic of Justification, 3.2. The Difference between Cognition and Judging, 3.3. The Selective Role of Relevancy, 3.4. Fact and Case: a Mental Transformation, 3.5. The Practical Dependency and Context of Qualification, 3.6. Descriptivity Excluded from the Normative Sphere (3.6.1. Concept and Type, Subsumption and Subordination), 3.7. The Unity of Fact and Value, 3.8. The Unity of Fact and Law (3.8.1. “Question of Fact” and “Question of Law”, 3.8.2. The Question of “Ordinary Words”), 3.9. The Reflexivity of Factual and Normative Operations, 3.10. The Limited Natur of Cognition and the Indefinability of Language, 3.11. The Non-cognitive Dialectic of Normative Classification, 3.12. Ascriptivity as End Result

4. THE JUDICIAL ESTABLISHMENT OF FACTS AND ITS PROCEDURALITY   4.1. The Constitutive Nature of the Establishment of Facts, 4.2. Evidence and Procedurality (4.2.1. The Question of “Certainty”), 4.3. The Role of the Force of Law

5. THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL ESTABLISHMENT OF FACTS   5.1. As the Play of a Game, 5.2. As the Precondition to Mete out a Legal Sanction, 5.3. As a Non-cognitively Homogeneous Activity, 5.4. As the Reproduction of the Law as a System (5.4.1. The Claim for Normative Closedness, 5.4.2. The Openness of the Communication about Facts)

APPENDIX I: KELSEN’S THEORY OF LAW-APPLICATION: EVOLUTION, AMBIGUITIES, OPEN QUESTIONS   1. „Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre”, 2. „Allgemeine Staatslehre”, 3. „Reine Rechtslehre” (3.1. Theory of Gradation, 3.2. The Constitutive Character of Law-application, 3.3. Theoretical Question Marks, 3.4. The Theory of Interpretation, 3.5. A Procedural View of Law?, 3.6. Self-transcendence of the Pure Theory?, 3.7. Who Watches the Watchman?)

APPENDIX II: JUDICIAL REPRODUCTION OF THE LAW IN AN AUTOPOIETICAL SYSTEM?  

POSTFACE I: AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL ESTABLISHMENT OF FACTS [1990/1994 & 1991/1992 & 2009]   The Investigation / What Kind of Path has been Covered? / How can we Get Closer to a Feasible Answer? / The Range of Problems in Connection with Facts / Theoretical Advance

POSTFACE II: WHAT IS TO COME AFTER LEGAL POSITIVISM IS OVER? DEBATES REVOLVING AROUND THE TOPIC OF »THE JUDICIAL ESTABLISHMENT OF FACTS« [2001]   Natural Law and Legal Positivism / Legal Positivism and its Logic / Autopoiesis in Praxis / Formalism and Antiformalism in Kelsen-interpretation / On Facts / Fact and Law / Inseparability within the Prevailing Totality / Answers in Deconstructionism

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Csaba VARGA: Paradigms of Legal Thinking (1999/2012)

March 12, 2012 Leave a comment

The Paradigms of Legal Thinking [1999] enlarged 2nd ed. (Budapest: Szent István Társulat 2012) 418 [Philosophiae Iuris]

1. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS

2. METHODOLOGICAL DIRECTIONS IN THINKING (2.1. The example of legal development [2.1.1. Classical Greek antiquity, 2.1.2. Roman legal development {2.1.2.1. The dikaion-period, 2.1.2.2. Praetorian law. 2.1.2.3. Justinian’s codification]}, 2.1.3. Enlightened absolutism, 2.1.4. The codificational ideal of the Code civil, 2.1.5. Turning point in the way of thinking], 2.2. The example of geometry [2.2.1. Euclidean geometry, 2.2.2. Challenge by Bolyai and Lobachevsky, 2.2.3. Einstein’s revolution], 2.3. The example of thinking [2.3.1. Autonomy {2.3.1.1. New Testament argumentation, 2.3.1.2. Cicero’s testimony, 2.3.1.3. Saint Augustine, 2.3.1.4. The Talmudic lesson, 2.3.1.5. Orthodox Christianity, 2.3.1.6. Modern “irrationalism”, 2.3.1.7. Beyond conceptual strait-jackets, 2.3.1.8. Patterns of thought, patterns of law}, 2.3.2. Heteronomy {2.3.2.1. Saint Thomas Aquinas, 2.3.2.2. Grotius, 2.3.2.3. Leibniz}, 2.3.3. The dilemma of the evolution of thought)

3. SCIENCE-THEORETICAL QUESTIONS RAISED BY THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY

4. PARADIGMS OF THINKING (4.1. The paradigm of paradigms [4.1.1. Conventionality, 4.1.2. Cultural dependence, 4.1.3. The nature of paradigms], 4.2. The basic notions of “fact”, “concept”, “logic”, and “thinking” [4.2.1. The need for a change of paradigms, 4.2.2. The false alternative of objectivism and subjectivism, 4.2.3. What are facts?, 4.2.4. What are notions?], 4.3. Dilemmas of conceptualising the norm)

5. DILEMMAS OF MEANING (5.1. Theories of meaning [5.1.1. Lexicality, 5.1.2. Contextuality, 5.1.3. Hermeneutics, 5.1.4. Open texture, 5.1.5. Deconstructionism], 5.2. Social construction of meaning [5.2.1. Speech-acts, 5.2.2. Social institutionalisation], 5.3. Autopoiesis and systemic response)

6. PARADIGMS OF LEGAL THINKING (6.1. The nature of law [6.1.1. Law as process, 6.1.2. Multifactorality, 6.1.3. Law as made up from acts], 6.2. The nature of legal thinking)

7. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

Appendix I. LAW AND ITS APPROACH AS A SYSTEM (I.1. The logical structure of law as a historical product, I.2. Tendencies of formal rationalization in legal development)

Appendix II. IS LAW A SYSTEM OF ENACTMENTS? (II.1. Working models of law, II.2. Senses of contextuality in law, II.3. Jurisprudential approach and socio-ontological approach, II.4. Conclusions [II.4.1. Law as historical continuum, II.4.2. Law as open system, II.4.3. Law as complex phenomenon with alternative strategies, II.4.4. Law as an irreversible process, II.4.5. The genuinely societal character of law])

Appendix III. INSTITUTIONS AS SYSTEMS (III.1. A logic of systems, III.2. Ideal types and historically concrete manifestations, III.3. Ideal type as a normative ideology, III.4. Objectivity and contingency of systems, III.5. Limits and bonds, consequentiality and practicability of a system)

Appendix IV. LEGAL TECHNIQUE (IV.1. Legal technique {IV.1.1. [In a broader sense], IV.1.2. [In legal practice], IV.1.3. [In legal scholarship], IV.1.4. [Law as a special technique]}, IV.2. On legal technique {IV.2.1. Definition and function, IV.2.2. Legal technique and legal cultures, IV.2.3. Postulates of legal technique in the cultures of modern formal law})

Appendix V. THE INHERENT AMBIVALENCE OF A RATIONAL APPROACH (Is the human fullness of being to be destroyed as a price of progress?)