Home > Legal Methodology, Ontology of Law > Csaba VARGA: Theory of the Judicial Process; The Establishment of Facts (1995/2011)

Csaba VARGA: Theory of the Judicial Process; The Establishment of Facts (1995/2011)

Theory of the Judicial Process The Establishment of Facts [1995] 2nd {reprint} ed. with Postfaces I and II (Budapest: Szent István Társulat 2011) viii + 308



2. THE FACT AND ITS APPROACH IN PHILOSOPHY AND IN LAW   2.1. The Understanding of Facts, 2.2. The Cognition of Facts, 2.3. Brute Fact and Institutional Fact (2.3.1. Process-like Development, 2.3.2. Graduality, 2.3.3. Being Attached to Objectivisation or Self-generation, 2.3.4. Indeterminateness, 2.3.5. Relativity, 2.3.6. Historicity and the Methodological Dilemma of Cognition), 2.4. The Particularity of the Appearance of Fact in Law

3. THE IMPUTATIVE CHARATER OF THE JUDICIAL ESTABLISHMENT OF FACTS   3.1. Logic of Problem Solving and Logic of Justification, 3.2. The Difference between Cognition and Judging, 3.3. The Selective Role of Relevancy, 3.4. Fact and Case: a Mental Transformation, 3.5. The Practical Dependency and Context of Qualification, 3.6. Descriptivity Excluded from the Normative Sphere (3.6.1. Concept and Type, Subsumption and Subordination), 3.7. The Unity of Fact and Value, 3.8. The Unity of Fact and Law (3.8.1. “Question of Fact” and “Question of Law”, 3.8.2. The Question of “Ordinary Words”), 3.9. The Reflexivity of Factual and Normative Operations, 3.10. The Limited Natur of Cognition and the Indefinability of Language, 3.11. The Non-cognitive Dialectic of Normative Classification, 3.12. Ascriptivity as End Result

4. THE JUDICIAL ESTABLISHMENT OF FACTS AND ITS PROCEDURALITY   4.1. The Constitutive Nature of the Establishment of Facts, 4.2. Evidence and Procedurality (4.2.1. The Question of “Certainty”), 4.3. The Role of the Force of Law

5. THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL ESTABLISHMENT OF FACTS   5.1. As the Play of a Game, 5.2. As the Precondition to Mete out a Legal Sanction, 5.3. As a Non-cognitively Homogeneous Activity, 5.4. As the Reproduction of the Law as a System (5.4.1. The Claim for Normative Closedness, 5.4.2. The Openness of the Communication about Facts)

APPENDIX I: KELSEN’S THEORY OF LAW-APPLICATION: EVOLUTION, AMBIGUITIES, OPEN QUESTIONS   1. „Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre”, 2. „Allgemeine Staatslehre”, 3. „Reine Rechtslehre” (3.1. Theory of Gradation, 3.2. The Constitutive Character of Law-application, 3.3. Theoretical Question Marks, 3.4. The Theory of Interpretation, 3.5. A Procedural View of Law?, 3.6. Self-transcendence of the Pure Theory?, 3.7. Who Watches the Watchman?)


POSTFACE I: AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL ESTABLISHMENT OF FACTS [1990/1994 & 1991/1992 & 2009]   The Investigation / What Kind of Path has been Covered? / How can we Get Closer to a Feasible Answer? / The Range of Problems in Connection with Facts / Theoretical Advance

POSTFACE II: WHAT IS TO COME AFTER LEGAL POSITIVISM IS OVER? DEBATES REVOLVING AROUND THE TOPIC OF »THE JUDICIAL ESTABLISHMENT OF FACTS« [2001]   Natural Law and Legal Positivism / Legal Positivism and its Logic / Autopoiesis in Praxis / Formalism and Antiformalism in Kelsen-interpretation / On Facts / Fact and Law / Inseparability within the Prevailing Totality / Answers in Deconstructionism

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